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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2006); see also Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403 (2008) (providing 
for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings) and § 34A-2-801(8) (2009). 
ISSUE 
Issue: Did the Commission properly dismiss Mr. Keller's claim and the 
subsequent claim filed by his estate due to the death of Mr. Keller? 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law where appellate review gives no 
deference to the agency's determination. Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177 
(Utah 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-67 (1975) was the permanent total disability statute 
in effect at the time of Mr. Keller's industrial accident and is controlling. Section 34A-2-
423 is also referenced. Full copies of the statutes are provided in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE & FACTS 
This case involves primarily procedural issues. Therefore, the statement of the 
facts and the statement of the case are combined. 
1. On July 25, 1975, Thomas Keller was injured in a compensable industrial 
accident. 
2. On June 29, 1978, a Compensation Agreement was approved by the 
Commission memorializing an impairment rating. 
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On December 1, 2000, Mr. Keller filed an Application for Hearing claiming 
entitlement to permanent total disability benefits retroactively to his July 
25, 1975 date of injury. (Addendum E). 
During the litigation of his claim, Mr. Keller refused to cooperate with 
discovery, including the taking of his deposition to establish the pertinent 
facts of the case. (Addendum F). The deposition was never accomplished. 
On September 3, 2002, Mr. Keller passed away. (R. at 124). 
Contrary to the petitioner's alleged facts, On October 11, 2002, these 
respondents sent a letter to Judge Eblen requesting the claim be dismissed 
with prejudice due to Mr. Keller's passing and the current state of the law. 
(Addendum G). 
On October 23, 2002, Judge Eblen dismissed the Application for Hearing 
noting that under the current law the "claim cannot proceed". (R at 4, 
Addendum D). 
On December 10, 2002, counsel for petitioner requested the proceedings in 
the matter be stayed pending a decision from the appellate courts on a 
similar case. (R. at 151, Addendum H). The letter was filed, untimely, 18 
days after the time allowed for a Motion for Review. The Commission 
took no action in response to the letter. 
Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-423, which allows a claim previously filed 
by an injured worker to be pursued by the estate in case of death, was 
enacted in 2003. 
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10. On April 25, 2005, Kelari Mecham filed an Amended Application for 
Hearing on behalf of the estate. (R at 6). 
11. On June 16, 2006, Judge Sessions entered an Order of Dismissal with 
prejudice that stated, among other things, that the estate could not pursue 
benefits. (R at 189, Addendum C). The decision was affirmed by the 
Commission by Order dated March 31, 2009. The Commission specifically 
noted the law at the time of Mr. Keller's injury, and at the time of his death, 
did not allow the estate to pursue benefits. (R at 246, Addendum B). 
12. On April 27, 2009, petitioner filed both a Petition for Review and a 
Docketing Statement. 
13. On May 6, 2009, this Court issued a briefing schedule giving the petitioner 
until June 18, 2008 to file a brief. 
14. On June 22, 2009, this Court granted the petitioner an extension to file a 
brief by July 20, 2009. 
15. Petitioner failed to file a timely brief and respondents requested dismissal 
of this appeal, which was granted on July 29, 2009, but gave the petitioner 
additional time to respond. Thereafter, petitioner requested another 
extension, which was granted over objections to the same on August 13, 
2009. The Order gave petitioner until September 16, 2009 to file a brief 
and specifically stated no further extensions would be granted absent a 
showing of emergency circumstances. 
16. Petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Disposition on August 28, 2009. 
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17. On October 19, 2009, the Court issued an Order denying the Motion for 
Summary Disposition and requiring the petitioner to file a brief compliant 
with the Rules of Appellate Procedure by October 27, 2009. 
18. On October 27, 2009, petitioner filed her brief. 
19. On November 17, 2009, the Court issued an Order requiring petitioner file 
to file a courtesy brief. 
20. Respondents believe no courtesy brief was ever filed by petitioner. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Commission properly dismissed with prejudice the claim for permanent total 
disability benefits arising from Mr. Kellers5 July 25, 1975 industrial accident. Long-
established case law held that benefits that had not vested at the time of the injured 
worker's death were not payable to the injured worker's estate. Therefore, Mr. Keller's 
death extinguished his claim for permanent total disability benefits. 
In addition, Mr. Kellers' death made it impossible for the Commission to make a 
final finding of permanent total disability clue to the requirement in Utah Code Annotated 
§ 35-1-67 that the Commission refer the injured worker to the divisional of vocational 
rehabilitation for certification of the injured workers ability to work or be retrained. 
Because no final finding could be made, benefits could not be awarded to Mr. Keller or 
his estate. 
The Commission's dismissal of these matters with prejudice was proper under the 
doctrine of res judicata afforded formal adjudicative proceedings in administrative 
settings. 
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The petitioner's brief did not comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
as required by prior Order of this Court. Therefore, the matter should be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Mr, Keller's claim for permanent total disability failed upon his death. 
Case law at the time of Mr. Kellers' death did not allow the estate, or his 
dependents to receive benefits based on undetermined benefits. The Court in Pacific 
States Cast Iron Pipe Co. V. Industrial Comm'n, 218 P.2d 970, 971 (Utah 1950) 
indicated, 
under the terms of the statute [the decedent's] dependents 
cannot obtain the benefits of the extension [of the limitations 
period] unless his claim has ripened into an award for or 
payments of compensation. 
Id. at 974. 
Although petitioner correctly notes that Pacific States was a case involving the 
occupational disease of silicosis, the argument that the case is inapplicable is in error. 
The Court in Pacific States relied on analogous case law from Parker v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 50 P.2d 278 (Utah 1935) and Heiselt v. Industrial Comm'n. 197 P. 589 (Utah 
1921). Parker was a case involving temporary total and permanent partial disability 
benefits from an industrial accident (not an occupational disease claim for silicosis). In 
Parker, the order awarding benefits was issued prior to the injured workers death. 
In Heiselt, the Court noted, "[w]e can hardly conceive of a right passing to an 
estate unless the right had vested in some one while living." Heiselt at 591. However, 
that claim dealt with permanent partial disability benefits, not permanent total disability 
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benefits. The injured worker in that case suffered injuries that resulted in amputations to 
his fingers. Id at 589-90. Unlike some impairments, amputations are and were covered 
by a specific schedule. As noted by the Court, permanent partial disability benefits, 
based on the loss of a member, immediately vested by virtue of the statute. Id. at 591. 
These cases established the principle of law that after the death of the injured worker an 
estate may only receive payment for accrued benefits that have vested. 
Pacific States merely explained the meaning of "accrued benefits55 further and how 
they vest. The Court in Pacific States specifically explained, 
Since no award had been made prior to the death of the 
employee and since no determination of causation or the 
weekly amounts to be paid had been made before that time, it 
would appear that no payments could have accrued. . . . It 
would, therefore, appear that had the legislature when it 
passed the latter act, intended to modify the rule that 
unaccrued payments would vest rights in dependents or 
personal representatives, it would have provided for tolling 
the limitation period by the filing of a claim so that an award 
could be made after death. 
Id at 974. (Emphasis added). 
Petitioner suggests that because there was an accident with an impairment rating 
that the permanent total disability benefits had accrued and were "due and owing from his 
employer.55 (Petitioner's Brief at 10). However, the passage of time alone does not mean 
benefits accrue. 
Moreover, whether or not the benefits may have accrued, the Petitioner has failed 
to address the vesting of the benefits. Mr. Keller did not have a vested interest in 
permanent total disability benefits because no determination regarding whether he was 
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permanently and totally disabled had been made prior to his death and the benefits did 
not vest pursuant to any statute. At the time of Mr. Keller's death, there had been no 
determination of causation, i.e, compensability of the claim for permanent total disability 
benefits. There is no record of whether Mr. Keller worked after his injury, what jobs he 
looked for, what other health conditions he may have had, or other factors that may affect 
whether Mr. Keller was truly permanently and totally disabled and, if so, whether the 
industrial accident caused the disability. Therefore, entitlement to benefits ceased upon 
his death. 
The law in effect at the time of the injury, which governs this claim, did not 
include any provisions that would allow the estate to maintain a claim for undetermined 
benefits. As the Court noted in Pacific States, it would have been an easy thing for the 
legislature to remedy the issue so death did not end liability, Id., but no such remedy was 
made until 2003 in the form of U.C. A. § 34A-2-423. Although the estate filed its claim 
in 2005, the 1975, not the 2005, law governs this matter. 
Mr. Keller, the injured worker died in 2002. Although § 34A-2-423 was amended 
in 2003 to allow claims to survive the death of the injured worker, the statute is 
substantive, not procedural, and, therefore, cannot be applied retroactively. (If retroactive 
application of the statute were allowed, retroactive application of other statutes, such as 
the 12 year statute of limitations on filing the claim found in § 34A-2-417, would also be 
required, thus barring even the decedent's claim for permanent total disability.) 
Therefore, respondents assert this claim is barred by the death of Mr. Keller based on 
long-standing case law and statutes that existed at the time of the accident and even at the 
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time of Mr. Keller's death and holds that an estate may not pursue benefits that have not 
accrued and vested in the injured worker at the time of death. 
II. Section 35-1-67 (1975) prevents an award in this matter. 
Not only is retroactive application of § 34A-2-423 not appropriate due to the 
substantive nature of the statute, but it would conflict with § 35-1-67(1975), which 
prevents an award in this matter. Section 35-1-67 (1975) states, 
that a finding by the commission of permanent total disability 
shall in all cases be tentative and not final until such time as 
the following proceedings have been had: 
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be 
permanently and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that 
the industrial commission of Utah refer such employee to the 
division of vocational rehabilitation . . . for rehabilitation 
training . . . . If and when the division of vocational 
rehabilitation . . . certifies to the industrial commission of 
Utah in writing that such employee has fully co-operated with 
the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to 
rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the 
employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall 
order that there be paid to such employee weekly benefits . . . 
(Emphasis added). Unlike the present permanent total disability statute, § 34A-2-
413, which allows payment of subsistence benefits following the tentative finding of 
permanent total disability, but before a final award is made, benefits may only be paid out 
under § 35-1-67 (1975) after the final order is issued. Because a deceased injured worker 
cannot be referred to the division of vocational rehabilitation and thereby have his ability 
to be retrained assessed, there can be no final order and the Commission can never order 
that benefits be paid. Based on the above, this claim is moot. 
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III. A Stipulation in a separate case with different parties is not binding. 
Petitioner's only other argument is that the stipulation reached in Smith v. Labor 
Comm'n, Supreme Court Case No. 20010738-SC (incorrectly cited by petitioner) is 
controlling. However, the Supreme Court did not issue an opinion in Smith and the 
Stipulation reached in Smith provides no precedential support. 
There is no decision from the Supreme Court in Smith on whether a claim survives 
the death of the injured worker. Rather, the employer and insurance carrier in Smith 
stipulated that the changes to § 34A-2-423 governed that claim, and the Commission, 
having no liability in the matter, signed off on the Stipulation because it was a party to 
the appeal. Therefore, the true impact of the Stipulation was on the employer and carrier 
in that matter, not the Commission, and does not set policy or establish a principle of law. 
Because there is no supporting case law for applying § 34A-2-423 to cases before its 
enactment, petitioner's argument is in essence that respondents are bound by the 
Stipulation reached in Smith, when respondents were not even a party to that case. 
However, such a stipulation does not meet the requirements of res judicata and has no 
effect on these proceedings. See Macris & Assoc, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93. 
IV. The Commission has authority to dismiss claims with prejudice. 
Petitioner argues that the Commission lacks the ability to dismiss claims with 
prejudice based on the Commission's continuing jurisdiction. The cases relied upon by 
Petitioner for this argument do not support the same. Doubletree v. Industrial Comm'n, 
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797 P.2d 464 (Utah App. 1990) was addressing the Commission's authority to dismiss a 
case without prejudice. It is clearly implied from the body of that decision that the 
Commission had authority to dismiss claims with prejudice, but that a dismissal based on 
procedural errors is more properly done without prejudice. Id, Bacon v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 854 P.2d 548 (Ut. App. 1991), addressed the issue of whether the Commission 
abused its discretion by dismissing a claim with prejudice again for procedural errors. 
Once again, it is clear that the Commission had the discretion to dismiss a claim with 
prejudice, but the issue was whether it was done properly. Id. at 549. 
In essence, petitioner argues that the Commission lacks the authority to issue a 
binding decision that would have res judicata effect on subsequent proceedings. This 
argument stands in direct opposition to many appellate cases specifically upholding the 
application of res judicata in workers compensation matters. See Acosta v. Salt Lake 
Regional Medical Center, 2004 UT App. 411, Crafts v. Labor Common, 2005 UT App. 
238, and Strate v. Labor Common, 2006 UT App. 179. 
If Commission decisions had no res judicata effect, workers compensation 
litigation would be meaningless as any party could continually challenge an adverse 
decision. However, there is simply no statutory or case law support to assume that the 
Commission lacks the authority to dismiss a case with prejudice simply because it has 
continuing jurisdiction. Therefore, the argument should be rejected and the 
Commission's decision upheld. 
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V. Petitioner's Brief does not comply with Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Disposition on August 28, 2009. The 
Motion was denied by the Court on October 19, 2009. In its Order, the Court specifically 
ordered that the petitioner's brief shall conform to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The Court stated that, if petitioner's brief did not conform to Rule 24, the 
appeal may be dismissed. 
Rule 24 (a)(l 1)(C) requires the brief to contain an addendum including the 
challenged findings of fact and conclusions of law. The addendum to the brief, however, 
contains none of the orders related to the case at hand. All the information contained in 
the addendum is from other cases. 
In addition, due to petitioner's failure to file a courtesy brief, the Court issued an 
Order on November 17, 2009 requiring the courtesy brief be filed within seven days. No 
courtesy brief has been filed. Based on the above, petitioner's brief does not comply with 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and this matter should be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission properly dismissed the claim for permanent total 
disability benefits whether filed by Mr. Keller himself or re-filed by his estate. The death 
of Mr. Keller extinguished his claim for permanent total disability benefits because there 
had not been, nor could there be a finding of permanent total disability at the time of his 
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death. Therefore, no benefits had been awarded, nor had any benefits vested in Mr. 
Keller. 
The Commission properly dismissed the claim with prejudice because the doctrine 
of continuing jurisdiction does not eliminate the Commission's ability to adjudicate 
claims and issue rulings that have res judicata effect. Therefore, the Commission's 
decision should be upheld. 
Petitioner's appeal should be dismissed for failure to comply with prior Orders 
from this Court. 
DATED this ? / day of u j ^ . , 2009. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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Addendum A 
Statutes and Rules 
*1975 Amendment* 
35-1-67. Schedule of benefits for permanent total disability. 
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 662/3% of his average weekly 
wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a 
dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the 
employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of the injury per week. However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or 
its insurance carrier be required to pay such weekly compensation payments for more than 312 
weeks, and provided further, that a finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in 
all cases be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been had: 
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and totally disabled, it shall 
be mandatory that the industrial commission of Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational 
rehabilitation under the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of 
the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation division, out of that special fund 
provided for by section 35-1-68(1), not to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of 
such employee; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally follow the practice 
applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the rehabilitation of employees having combined 
injuries. If and when the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education 
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing that such employee has fully co-operated with 
the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the 
division the employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order that there be paid to 
such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66%% of his average weekly wages at the time of the 
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and $5 
for each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such 
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dependent minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the 
injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week out 
of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68(1), for such period of time beginning with the 
time that the payments (as in this section provided) to be made by the employer or its insurance 
carrier terminate and ending with the death of the employee. No employee, however, shall be entitled 
to any such benefits if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the division of vocational rehabilitation 
as set forth herein. 
Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally disabled and on that date 
or prior thereto were receiving compensation benefits from the special fund provided for by section 
35-1-68(1) shall be paid compensation benefits at the rate of $60 per week. 
Commencing July 1, 1975, all persons who were permanently and totally disabled on or before 
March 5, 1949, and were receiving compensation benefits and continue to receive such benefits shall 
be paid compensation benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68(1) at a rate 
sufficient to bring their weekly benefit to $60 when combined with employer or insurance carrier 
compensation payments. 
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the vocational training of 
the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is qualified to 
perform, and thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be 
heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of 
bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both arms, or both feet or both 
legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall constitute total and permanent disability, to be 
compensated according to the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total 
disability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases, however, and where there has been 
rehabilitation effected but where there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon 
partial permanent disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay compensation for any 
combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, 
including loss of function, in excess of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week for 312 weeks. 
[Effective May 13, 1975-May 9, 1977.] 
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eyeglasses, the employer or insurance carrier shall provide a 
replacement of the artificial means or appliance. 
(4) An administrative law judge may require the employer 
or insurance carrier to maintain the artificial means or 
appliances or provide the employee with a replacement of any 
artificial means or appliance for the reason of breakage, wear 
and tear, deterioration, or obsolescence. 
(5) An administrative law judge may, in unusual cases, 
order, as the administrative law judge considers jus t and 
proper, the payment of additional sums: 
(a) for burial expenses; or 
(b) to provide for artificial means or appliances. 1997 
34A-2-419. A g r e e m e n t s in addit ion to compensat ion 
and benef i ts . 
(1) (a) Subject to the approval of the division, any employer 
securing the payment of workers' compensation benefits 
for its employees under Section 34A-2-201 may enter into 
or continue any agreement with the employer's employees 
to provide compensation or other benefits in addition to 
the compensation and other benefits provided by this 
chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(b) An agreement may not be approved if it requires 
contributions from the employees, unless it confers ben-
efits in addition to those provided under this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, at least com-
mensurate with the contributions. 
(c) An agreement for additional benefits may be termi-
nated by the division if: 
(i) it appears that the agreement is not fairly 
administered; 
(ii) its operation discloses defects threatening its 
solvency; or 
(iii) for any substantial reason it fails to accom-
plish the purposes of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 
(d) If the agreement is terminated, the division shall 
determine the proper distribution of any remaining as-
sets. 
(e) The termination under Subsection (l)(c) becomes a 
final order of the commission effective 30 days from the 
date the division terminates the agreement, unless within 
the 30 days either the employer or employee files an 
application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication 
in accordance with Part 8, Adjudication. The application 
for hearing may contest: 
(i) the recommendation to terminate the agree-
ment; 
(ii) the distribution of remaining assets after ter-
mination; or 
(iii) both the recommendation to terminate and the 
distribution of remaining assets. 
(2) (a) Any employer who makes a deduction from the 
wages or salary of any employee to pay for the statutory 
benefits of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(b) Subject to the supervision of the division, nothing in 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, 
may be construed as preventing the employer and the 
employer's employees from entering into mutual con-
tracts and agreements respecting hospital benefits and 
accommodations, medical and surgical services, nursing, 
and medicines to be furnished to the employees as pro-
vided in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, if no direct or indirect profit is made by any 
employer as a result of the contract or agreement. 
(3) The purpose and intent of this section is that, where 
hospitals are maintained and medical and surgical services 
and medicines furnished by the employer from payments by, 
or assessments on, the employer's employees, the payments or 
assessments may not be more or greater than necessary to 
make these benefits self-supporting for the care and treatment 
of the employer's employees. Money received or retained by 
the employer from the employees for the purpose of these 
benefits shall be paid and applied to these services. Any 
hospitals so maintained in whole or in part by payments or 
assessment of employees are subject to the inspection and 
supervision of the division as to services and treatment 
rendered to the employees. 1997 
34A-2-420. Continuing jurisdict ion of commiss ion — 
No authority to c h a n g e s t a t u t e s of l imi ta t ion 
— Authority to d e s t r o y r e c o r d s — I n t e r e s t on 
award — Authority to a p p r o v e final settle-
m e n t c la ims . 
(1) (a) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over 
each case shall be continuing. 
(b) After notice and hearing, the Division of Adjudica-
tion, commissioner, or Appeals Board in accordance with 
Part 8, Adjudication, may from time to time modify or 
change a former finding or order of the commission. 
(c) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in 
any respect the statutes of limitations contained in other 
sections of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. 
(d) The commission may not in any respect change the 
statutes of limitation referred to in Subsection (l)(c) 
(2) Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and 
inactive for ten years, other than cases of total permanent 
disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section 
34A-2-417, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commis-
sion. 
(3) Awards made by a final order of the commission shall 
include interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date 
when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due 
and payable. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) and Section 34A-2-108, 
an administrative law judge shall review and may approve the 
agreement of the parties to enter into a full and final: 
(a) compromise settlement of disputed medical, disabil-
ity, or death benefit entitlements under this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; or 
(b) commutation and settlement of reasonable future 
medical, disability, or death benefit entitlements under 
this chapter or Chapter 3 by means of a lump sum^ 
payment, structured settlement, or other appropriate j 
payout. I997j 
34A-2-421. L u m p - s u m p a y m e n t s . | 
An administrative law judge, under special circumstances! 
and when the same is deemed advisable, may c o m m u | j | 
periodic benefits to one or more lump-sum payments. i " 3 
34A-2-422. Compensat ion exempt from execution. • 
Compensation before payment shall be exempt from a | j 
claims of creditors, and from attachment or execution, angj 
shall be paid only to employees or their dependents. 1fjB 
34A-2-423. Su rv iva l of c l a im in case of dea th . U 
(1) As used in this section: 1 1 8 
(a) "Estate" is as defined in Section 75-1-201. 'WM 
(b) "Personal representative" is as defined in S e c g « 
(2) The personal representative of the estate of a n . e m ^ ^ H 
may adjudicate an employee's claim for compensation JjgSfl 
this chapter if in accordance with this chapter, the e m ^ ^ ^ B 
files a claim: J l ^ ^ l 
(a) before the employee dies; and f j 9 | ^ | 
(b) for compensation for an industrial a c c i d e n A j | | ^ H 
pational disease for which compensation is paya ^mj^M 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational u^^M^M 
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lithe commission finds that the employee is entitled to 
Hon under this chapter for the claim described in 
.. (2Xa), the commission shall order that compensa-
t e d for the period: 
a) beginning on the day on which the employee is 
ktled to receive compensation under this chapter; and 
lift,) ending on the day on which the employee dies. 
t(a) Compensation awarded under Subsection (3) shall 
• paid to: 
(i) if the employee has one or more dependents on 
the day on which the employee dies, to the depen-
dents of the employee; or 
(ii) if the employee has no dependents on the day 
on which the employee dies, to the estate of the 
employee. 
(b) The commission may apportion any compensation 
H paid to dependents under this Subsection (4) in the 
W manner that the commission considers just and equitable. 
65) If an employee that files a claim under this chapter dies 
1 the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the 
of the employee's claim, the compensation awarded 
rider this section shall be in addition to death benefits 
awarded in accordance with Section 34A-2-414. 2003 
PART 5 
INDUSTRIAL NOISE 
34A-2-501. Definitions. 
(1) "Harmful industrial noise" means: 
(a) sound that results in acoustic t rauma such as 
sudden instantaneous temporary noise or impulsive or 
impact noise exceeding 140 dB peak sound pressure 
levels; or 
(b) the sound emanating from equipment and ma-
chines during employment exceeding the following per-
missible sound levels, dBA slow response, and correspond-
ing durations per day, in hours: 
Sound Level 
90 
92 
95 
97 
100 
102 
105 
110 
115 
Duration 
8 
6 
4 
3 
2 
1.5 
1.0 
0.5 
0.25 or less 
(2) "Loss of hearing" means binaural hearing loss measured 
in decibels with frequencies of 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 
cycles per second (Hertz). If the average decibel loss at 500, 
1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 cycles per second (Hertz) is 25 decibels 
or less, usually no hearing impairment exists. 1997 
34A-2-502. Intensi ty tests . 
(1) The commission may conduct tests to determine the 
intensity of noise at places of employment. 
(2) An administrative law judge may consider tests con-
ducted by the commission, and any other tests taken by 
authorities in the field of sound engineering, as evidence of 
harmful industrial noise. 1997 
34A-2-503. Loss of hear ing — Occupational hear ing 
loss due to noise to be compensated. 
(1) Permanent hearing loss caused by exposure to harmful 
industrial noise or by direct head injury shall be compensated 
according to the terms and conditions of this chapter or 
(2) A claim for compensation for hearing loss for harmful 
industrial noise may not be paid under this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, unless it can be 
demonstrated by a professionally controlled sound test that 
the employee has been exposed to harmful industrial noise as 
defined in Section 34A-2-501 while employed by the employer 
against whom the claim is made. 1997 
34A-2-504. Loss of hear ing — Extent of employer's 
liability. 
(1) An employer is liable only for the hearing loss of an 
employee that arises out of and in the course of the employee's 
employment for tha t employer. 
(2) If previous occupational hearing loss or nonoccupational 
hearing impairment is established by competent evidence, the 
employer may not be liable for the prior hearing loss so 
established, whether or not compensation has previously been 
paid or awarded. The employer is liable only for the difference 
between the percentage of hearing loss presently established 
and that percentage of prior hearing loss established by 
preemployment audiogram or other competent evidence. 
(3) The date for compensation for occupational hearing loss 
shall be determined by the date of direct head injury or the 
last date when harmful industrial noise contributed substan-
tially in causing the hearing loss. 1997 
34A-2-505. Loss of hear ing — Compensat ion for per-
manent partial disability. 
(1) Compensation for permanent partial disability for bin-
aural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the 
percentage of binaural hearing loss by 109 weeks of compen-
sation benefits as provided in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 
(2) When an employee files one or more claims for hearing 
loss the percentage of hearing loss previously found to exist 
shall be deducted from any subsequent award by the commis-
sion. 
(3) In no event shall compensation benefits be paid for total 
or 100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 109 weeks of com-
pensation benefits. 1997 
34A-2-506. Loss of hear ing — Time for filing claim. 
An employee's occupational hearing loss shall be reported to 
the employer pursuant to Section 34A-2-407 within 180 days 
of the date the employee: 
(1) first suffered altered hearing; and 
(2) knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have known, tha t the hearing loss was caused by 
employment. 1997 
34A-2-507. Measuring hear ing loss . 
(1) The degree of hearing loss shall be established, no 
sooner than six weeks after termination of exposure to the 
harmful industrial noise, by audiometric determination of 
hearing threshold level performed by medical or paramedical 
professionals recognized by the commission, as measured from 
0 decibels on an audiometer calibrated to ANSI-S3.6-1969, 
American National Standard "Specifications for Audiometers" 
(1969). 
(2) (a) In any evaluation of occupational hearing loss, only 
hearing levels at frequencies of 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 
3,000 cycles per second (Hertz) shall be considered. The 
individual measurements for each ear shall be added 
together and then shall be divided by four to determine 
the average decibel loss in each ear. 
(b) To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each 
ear, the average decibel loss for each decibel of loss 
exceeding 25 decibels shall be multiplied by 1.5% up to the 
maximum of 100% which is reached at 91.7 decibels. 
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Addendum B 
"Order Affirming ALJ's Decision" dated March 31, 2009 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
KELARIMECHAM, personal 
representative of the estate of 
THOMAS KELLER, deceased, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
SCOTTS ROUSTABOUT SERVICE, 
TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO., and 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND, 
Respondents. 
ORDER AFFIRMING 
ALJ'S DECISION 
Case No. 05-0406 
Kelari Mecham, in her capacity as personal representative of the estate of Thomas Keller, 
deceased, ("the Estate" hereafter) asks the Utah Labor Commissioner to review Administrative Law 
Judge Sessions' dismissal of the Estate's claim for permanent total disability compensation under the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated, on behalf of Mr. 
Keller. 
The Labor Commissioner exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to § 
63G-4-301 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and § 34A-2-801(3) of the Utah Workers 
Compensation Act. 
BACKGROUND 
While employed by Scotts Roustabout Services on July 25,1976, Mr. Keller was injured in a 
work-related accident. In 1978, the Utah Industrial Commission (predecessor to the current Labor 
Commission) approved an agreement between Mr. Keller, Scotts Roustabout Services, and its 
insurance carrier, Travelers Insurance Co., (referred to jointly as "Scotts" hereafter) for payment of 
permanent partial disability compensation to Mr. Keller. 
In December 2000, Mr. Keller filed an application for hearing with the Commission claiming 
permanent total disability compensation from Scotts and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("ERF")1 
for permanent total disability compensation. Mr. Keller died on September 3,2002. On October 23, 
2002, Judge Eblen dismissed Mr. Keller's claim on the grounds that the claim was extinguished by 
his death. Judge Eblen's ruling was not contested and became final on November 23, 2002. 
1
 Under the law in effect at the time of Mr. Mecham's accident in 1976, the ERF is liable for a 
portion of the benefits paid to individuals who are permanently and totally disabled as a result of 
work-related injuries. See § 34A-2-413(3) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
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On April 25, 2005, the Estate filed a new application for hearing, seeking to compel Scotts 
and the ERF to pay permanent total disability compensation to the Estate for Mr. Keller's alleged 
permanent total disability. Scotts and the EPJF moved for dismissal of the application. On June 16, 
2006, Judge Sessions granted the motions on the grounds, among others, that the Estate was not 
entitled to pursue a claim for permanent total disability compensation under the circumstances of this 
case. 
In its motion for review in this matter, the Estate challenges each of the grounds upon which 
Judge Sessions dismissed the Estate's application. However, because the Commission concludes 
that Judge Sessions was correct in his determination that the Estate is not entitled to pursue benefits 
in this matter, the Commission limits its discussion to that that issue. 
DISCUSSION 
Prior to 2003, Utah's appellate courts had ruled that "[t]he right to compensation for injuries 
is a right personal to the employee and unless payments have accrued or a determination has been 
made by the Commission there is no right to which the personal representative or a dependent can 
succeed " Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Industrial Commission, 218 P.2d 970,974 (Utah 
1950). 
As already noted, Mr. Keller had filed a claim for permanent total disability compensation in 
December 2000, but died in 2002 while the foregoing rule was in effect. For that reason, Judge 
Eblen dismissed Mr. Keller's then-pending claim. As also noted, there was no effort to appeal Judge 
Eblen's decision. Consequently, the determination that Mr. Keller's claim terminated upon his death 
became final and binding on November 23, 2002, 30 days after Judge Eblen issued the decision. 
The Commission notes the Estate's effort to revive this matter by relying on § 34A-2-423 of 
the Workers' Compensation Act. However, that statute was not enacted until 2003, after Judge 
Eblen's ruling already had become final. The Commission concludes that, under these 
circumstances, § 34A-2-423 does not apply to the Estate's claim. 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms Judge Sessions' decision. It is so ordered. 
Dated this J[ day of March, 2009. 
Sherrie Hayashi 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Affirming ALJ's Decision in the matter of Kelari 
Mecham, Personal Representative of the estate of Thomas Keller, Case No. 05-0406, was mailed 
first class postage prepaid this of March, 2009, to the following: 
Kelari Mecham 
Personal Representative, Estate of Thomas 
Keller 
Box 803 
Roosevelt UT 84066 
Scotts Roustabout Service 
Not Available 
Employers Reinsurance Fund 
160E300S 
PO Box 146611 
Salt Lake City UT 84114 
Travelers Insurance Co 
P O Box 173762 
Denver CO 80217 
Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
Virginius Dabney, Esq. 
1060 S Main St Ste 2 
St George UT 84770 
Mark R. Sumsion, Esq. 
Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson 
Box 2465 
Salt Lake City UT 84110 
Edwin C. Barnes, Esq. 
One Utah Center 13th Fl 
201 S Main St 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
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Addendum C 
"Memorandum Decision and Order of Dismissal" dated June 16, 1006 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
PO Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
801-530-6800 
KELARI MECHAM PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SCOTTS ROUSTABOUT SERVICE and/or 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND; 
TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 05-0406 
Judge Dale W Sessions 
THIS MATTER comes before the Labor Commission by way of a Motion to Dismiss 
filed by the Employers Reinsurance Fund and Respondent Scotts Roustabout Service. While the 
record shows that each Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss, they are treated as one motion 
for purposes of this Order. 
The issues raised by each party can be summarized as follows: 
1. Respondent argues that no provisions of the Utah Code Annotated and in particular 
the Worker's Compensation Act permit a personal representative of an injured worker 
to file a claim for permanent total disability compensation. Petitioner argues that no 
provisions prohibit a claim to be initiated by Petitioner's estate. 
2. The claim filed by the injured worker in a prior case was dismissed without prejudice 
and there is no basis for the estate of the injured worker to seek permanent total 
disability compensation. 
3. The Respondent(s) assert that the Labor Commission lacks jurisdiction to proceed to 
hear this matter and the Application for Hearing should be dismissed. 
4. Benefits after death are limited to those already accrued during life. 
5. Utah Code Ann., §35-1-67 in effect at the time of injury applies in this case. That 
statute required the Labor Commission to refer the injured worker who had been 
found to be tentatively permanent total disabled to the Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation. Only after full cooperation and inability to be rehabilitated was 
demonstrated did permanent total disability compensation payments commence. 
6. Utah Code Ann., §34A-2-423 became new law in 2003 and cannot be retroactively 
applied in this case. 
7. Dismissal of the Application for Hearing in this case in the earlier filing was without 
prejudice and therefore preserved the right to re-file in the estate. 
8. Both parties argue the application or denial of the application of a statute of 
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limitations in permanent total disability cases. 
UNDIS PUTED FACTS 
From the arguments of counsel, the following facts are not disputed. They form the 
basis for the legal arguments in the briefs submitted with the motion(s) and the responses thereto. 
They are: 
A. July 25,1975 Petitioner wTas injured in a compensable industrial accident. 
B. June 29, 1978 a Compensation Agreement was approved by the Commission. 
C. August 14, 1978 the Commission issued a Lump Sum Order. 
D. December 1, 2000 the injured worker filed an Application for Hearing claiming 
permanent total disability compensation. 
E. May 21, 2002 the Commission granted a Motion to Compel Petitioner to 
cooperate with discovery. 
F. September 3, 2002 Petitioner died. 
G. October 23, 2002 the Commission dismissed the Application for Hearing without 
prejudice. No objection was filed and no appeal taken from that final order. 
H. April 25, 2005 the estate of the injured worker, by and through the duly 
appointed personal representative, filed a new Application for Hearing and 
entitled it "Amended Application for Hearing." This application sought 
permanent total disability compensation and interest. It alleged industrial 
accident, occupational disease and death claims. In the Applicant's Amended 
Pre-trial Disclosures filed by Petitioner's Estate, the claim is reduced to 
permanent total disability benefits only. 
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ISSUE #1: Respondent argues that no provisions of the Utah Code Annotated and in 
particular the Worker's Compensation Act permit a personal representative of an injured 
worker to file a claim for permanent total disability compensation. Petitioner argues that 
no provisions prohibit a claim to be initiated by Petitioner's estate. 
This issue is best seen in light of the language of the Workers Compensation Act. 
Utah Code Ann., §34A-2-413(l)(b) provides that: "To establish entitlement to permanent total 
disability compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of 
evidence . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Utah Code Ann., §34A-2-104(l)(b) defines employee as 
"each person in the service of any employer, as defined in Section 34A-2-103, who employs one 
or more workers or operatives regularly in the same business, or in or about the same 
establishment.. . ." There is no provision in the Workers Compensation Act that acknowledges 
a personal representative in any manner. 
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While it is true that there are neither permissive or prohibitive terms pertaining to a 
personal representative making a filing for permanent total disability benefits, reason and 
reasonable inference can supply the answer. Utah Code Ann., §63-46(b)(l)(a) of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") defines "party" as "the agency or other persons 
commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding 
officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to 
participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding." See also Carter v. Sportform Health, Labor 
Commission #00-0675 (February 2002). In no case does the Worker's Compensation Act or 
UAPA refer to or imply that anyone can commence an action except in death benefit cases 
(which is not the case here) other than the injured employee. U.C.A,§34A-2-423 also requires 
that that the employee file a claim before he dies in order to preserve adjudication of his claim 
after he has died. 
The only and best source of the physical characteristics of an injured worker is the 
actual injured worker. Without the worker, there can be no meaningful evaluation of a claim for 
disability including partial or total and temporary or permanent conditions as well. Death 
benefits aside, there is a burden on the injured worker to demonstrate proof of the permanent and 
total disability factors as required by statute that would have been in effect at the time of injury, 
Latorre v. Delta Airlines, Labor Commission #00-1144 (September 2002); Abel v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 860 P.2d 367 (UT. APP. 1993), to wit: Utah Code Ann., §35-1-67. 
In 1975, §35-1-67 was amended to require permanent total disability benefits to be 
determined by a process. First, a tentative finding of permanent total disability must be made. 
Then it was mandatory for the employee to be referred to the Utah Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation under the State Board of Education for rehabilitation training. Only when, after 
full cooperation of the injured worker, the Division determined that the injured worker could not 
be rehabilitated and the Division so certified to the Labor Commission, would benefits 
commence. 
It follows that the express language of the statute cannot be complied with since the 
injured worker is deceased. It is true that the estate could supply some of the medical 
information and other relevant information. However, the ultimate required finding and 
certification from the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation would not be possible given that a 
deceased person would not be able to fully cooperate with rehabilitation services. As a result, 
the Motion to Dismiss should be granted. 
ISSUE #2: The claim filed by the injured worker in a prior case was dismissed without 
prejudice and there is no basis for the estate of the injured worker to seek permanent total 
disability compensation. 
The Application for Hearing was dismissed without prejudice and the ALJ included in 
the order the notice of rights to appeal. No objections thereto were made and no appeal was 
no K M 
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taken. In this way, the dismissal became voluntary. Although the dismissal was not sought by a 
party, no party resisted the order and it could rightfully be considered a voluntary dismissal 
under Utah law. "An ALJ's decision becomes final 30 days after it is issued unless a motion for 
review is filed within that period." Paulus v. Moroni Feed Co., Labor Commission #00-0882 
(August 2004). Utah Code Ann., §34-46b-12(l)(a) establishes a 30 day jurisdictional time limit 
for filing the Motion for Review. See also Giles v. Oakridge et a l Labor Commission #00-1228 
(July 2000). 
The inquiry then turns on the effect of the dismissal without prejudice. For guidance, 
we turn to the Utah Supreme Court opinion announced in Career Services Review Board v. Utah 
Department of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933 (Utah 1997). "Indeed this court has also stated that a 
"voluntary dismissal without prejudice 'renders the proceedings a nullity and leave the parties as 
if the action had never been brought."' Barton v. Utah Transit Authority, 872 P.2d 1036 (Utah 
1994)(quoting In re Piper Aircraft Distribution Systems Antitrust Litigation, 551 F.2d 213, 219 
(8th Cir. 1977). . . .[W]e see no reason . . .why the effect should not be the same for the dismissal 
of an appeal from the decision or order of an administrative agency." The effect is "the dismissal 
of his action and the right to bring a later suit on the same cause of action, without adjudication 
of the merits." Barton. (Other citations omitted.) 
In another case, Bowles v. State, 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1982) the Utah Supreme Court 
explained in footnote 3 of the opinion: "[tjhere are numerous rulings to the effect that a dismissal 
may be final for the purpose of appeal although it is without prejudice to the bringing of another 
action . . .4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal & Error § 108 and cases cited therein. See also Sherry v. Sherry, 
622 P.2d 9960 (Alaska 1981); and Carter v. Small Business Administration, 573 P.2d 564 (Colo., 
1977)." The ALJ dismissed the instant case without prejudice and included the Notice of Rights 
of Appeal at the close of the Order. It was a final order. No appeal was taken. No party 
protested the order and the dispute appeared resolved. 
McVinnie v. University of Utah Hospital 2004 UT App 63 (UT. CT. APP. 2004) 
states: The dismissal without prejudice in this case "disposed of the case and has the effect of a 
final order, thus permitting appellate review." Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75, Pl,n.2, 999 
P.2d 588. Because the dismissal concluded the action on the complaint and would require 
McVinnie to file a new complaint after fully complying with all statutory prerequisites, it is final 
for purposes of appeal. See Bowles v. State, 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1982)(stating if a new action 
must be commenced, the judgment ending the action is final for purposes of appeal). Such is the 
case here. The injured worker would have to start the case again by filing a new Application for 
Hearing. The dismissal was a final appealable order from which no appeal was taken. The 
Motion to Dismiss should be granted on this basis. 
ISSUE #3: The Respondent(s) assert that the Labor Commission lacks jurisdiction to 
proceed to hear this matter and the Application for Hearing should be dismissed. 
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This issue raises jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann., §34A-1-301 confers jurisdiction and 
power to the Labor Commission. That statute provides "[t]he commission has the duty and the 
full power, jurisdiction and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter or 
any other title or chapter it administers." The Commission may exercise such powers only as are 
expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. University of Utah v. 
Industrial Commission, 229 P. 1103 (Utah 1924); Parker v. Industrial Commission, 241 P. 362 
(Utah 1925). 
In the instant case, an Application for Hearing has been filed. Although incorrectly 
entitled "Amended Application for Hearing" the application has invoked the jurisdiction over the 
filing itself. A determination must be made as to the sufficiency of the filing and the standing of 
the person(s) involved in bringing the matter before the Labor Commission. The Labor 
Commission does have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim in all of its aspects from that point of 
filing. 
However, when standing is considered it might well be noted that by previous 
discussion in this decision, it would not be wise to permit claims that were not appropriately filed 
by a living injured worker to be filed posthumously through his estate (excepting death benefit 
claims) when the estate is not capable of demonstrating compliance with existing law at the time 
of injury. In that sense, the Labor Commission must determine whether the relief requested can 
be granted. When it cannot, the claim is moot and must be dismissed. "It is a well established 
principle of Utah law that courts, and by extension, administrative agencies, should not 
adjudicate claims when such adjudication will have no practical effect. "'If the requested 
judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants, the case is moot and a court will normally 
refrain from adjudicating it on the merits.'" (Citations omitted.) Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 
45 (Utah 1981)." "Once a controversy has become moot, a trial court should enter an order of 
dismissal." Merhish v. H.A. Folson & Associates, 646 P.2d 732 (Utah 1982)(quoted in Lu v. St. 
Mark's Hospital, Labor Commission Appeals Board Decision #8010440 (January 2005). 
The Labor Commission has jurisdiction to consider the current matter until it is 
determined that adjudication will have no practical effect. The injured worker is deceased and 
cannot participate in the matter as required by law to establish entitlement to a tentative and/or 
final permanent total disability determination for benefits then to be determined. The issue is, 
therefore, moot. The case should be dismissed as a matter of law. The Motion to Dismiss 
should be granted on this basis. 
ISSUE #4: Benefits after death are limited to those already accrued during life. 
This issue relies on the Utah Supreme Court decision announced in Pacific States Cast 
Iron Pipe Co., v. Industrial Commission, 218 P.2d 970 (Utah 1950). There the court stated that 
"under the terms of the statute . . . dependants cannot obtain the benefits . . . unless [the] claim 
has ripened into an award for payments of compensation." Id, at 971. Further, the court 
00193 
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reasoned, that "since no award had been made prior to the death of the employee and since no 
determination of causation or the weekly amounts to be paid has been made before that time, it 
would appear that no payments could have accrued. . . .It would, therefore, appear that had the 
legislature . . . intended to modify the rule that unaccrued payments would vest rights in 
dependents or personal representatives, it would have provided for tolling the limitation period 
by the filing of a claim so that an award could be made after death." Id, at 974. 
The legislature has not enacted a statute providing for filing after death, except in 
cases where a death results from the industrial accident. In the instant case, the injured worker 
died approximately 30 years after the injury of unrelated lung cancer. Based on this reasoning, 
the Motion to Dismiss should be granted. 
ISSUE #5: Utah Code Ann., §35-1-67 in effect at the time of injury applies in this case. 
That statute required the Labor Commission to refer the injured worker who had been 
found to be tentatively permanent total disabled to the Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation. Only after full cooperation and inability to be rehabilitated was 
demonstrated did permanent total disability compensation payments commence. 
This issue has been discussed and disposed of under Issue #1 above. Based upon the 
reasoning included there and incorporated here by this reference, the Motion to Dismiss should 
be granted. 
ISSUE #6: Utah Code Ann., §34A-2-423 became new law in 2003 and cannot be 
retroactively applied in this case. 
The issue of which law applies has been discussed above in Issue #1. The new code 
section is not an explanation of earlier statute, it is wholly new law. At the time the new law was 
announced, the injured worker in this case had been deceased for some time and there was no 
application for hearing pending to which it may have application even if it could be applied 
retroactively. The Motion to Dismiss should be granted on that basis. 
ISSUE #7: Dismissal of the Application for Hearing in this case in the earlier filing was 
without prejudice and therefore preserved the right to re-file in the estate. 
This issue was discussed in Issue #2 above. Nothing was preserved in the dismissal 
without prejudice except a right to re-file. It is not the estate that had the right, but the injured 
worker. (It is noted that by the time the dismissal without prejudice was issued by the ALJ, the 
injured worker was deceased.) The inaction of the injured worker's estate at the time of the 
dismissal showed acquiescence in the dismissal and the ALJ's order became final after 30 days. 
Paulus; Utah Code Ann., §34-46b-12(l)(a). No right to re-file existed for the estate to file upon. 
Nothing remained for the estate to relate to in filing the 'Amended Application for Hearing.' 
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The initial application was a nullity. Barton. The failure to timely act on the order of dismissal 
is fatal to the estate's argument. 
Petitioner includes as an exhibit to his Response to the Motion to Dismiss both 
references to and documents from the case of Smith v. Labor Commission, (UT. Ct. App. Case 
#20001019) (however the case numbers on the actual documents are Case No. 20010736-SC on 
the Notice of Decision and Labor Commission Case No. 97-0408 on the Order of Remand and 
on the Stipulation for Dismissal and Remand. The case was pending on appeal at the time the 
legislature changed the law in 2003. The parties stipulated to a remand of the case. The 
stipulation sets forth reasoning that is not in alignment with the opinion of Counsel on the 
subject. The stipulation contains the following paragraph: 
The Utah Legislature during its 2003 general session passed Senate Bill 126, 
which has now been signed by Governor Leavitt. Among other elements, S.B. 126 adds 
S34A-2-423 to the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, specifically providing that an 
injured worker's pending claim for benefits is not extinguished by the worker's death." 
PageR-2-055. 
This evidences an understanding of the legislation that Petitioner's counsel (both in 
that case and the instance case) has now abandoned. He would rather the ALJ determine that any 
benefits arising during life are continued in the rights of the personal representative in the estate 
of the injured worker. The better interpretation of the new statute is that the pending claims of 
an injured worker survive the death of the injured worker. The new statute clearly states: 
. . . (2) The personal representative of the estate of an employee may adjudicate an 
employee's claim for compensation under this chapter if in accordance with this 
chapter, the employee files a claim: 
(a) before the employee dies; and 
(b) for compensation for an industrial accident or occupational disease for 
which compensation is payable under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. (Emphasis added.) 
Because the estate failed to file and prevail against the ALJ's dismissal within the 
period allowed by law, they lost the right to proceed on the Application for Hearing. The Motion 
to Dismiss should be granted on this basis. 
ISSUE #8: Both parties argue the application or denial of the application of a statute of 
limitations in permanent total disability cases. 
ilili o n 
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The state of the law at the time of the injury governs the case. At that time, there was 
no statute of limitations concerning permanent total disability claims. Vigos v. Mountainland 
Builders, 993 P.2d 207, P14 (Utah 2000). However, there was a process by which the 
establishment of such claims could be brought about. It is a fact that the injured worker did not 
establish his claim prior to his death, but he had filed an Application for Hearing. Utah Code 
Ann., §34A-2-423 did not yet exist. The injured worker's initial attempt to establish his claim 
was dismissed after he was deceased. The estate failed to preserve his claim by filing a timely 
motion for review of the ALJ's decision. Even if they had appealed, it is doubtful that any 
change in the ruling of the ALJ would have been made. A deceased person cannot participate in 
the statutorily required process to establish a claim under the 1975 law. There is no conceivable 
way that the estate can comply with the 1975 law at this time. (See discussion of Issue #5 
above.) No statute of limitations has application to the facts and circumstances of this case. The 
Motion to Dismiss should be granted on this basis. 
Finally, to the extent that Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, 993 P.2d 207 (Utah 2000) 
requires that the Labor Commission acknowledge the prior filing as sufficient to overcome the 
technical filing requirement, it would make no difference in this case. The relief requested by 
the injured worker's estate cannot be granted because the injured worker is deceased and cannot 
conform to the requirements of the 1975 statute which was in effect at the time of his injury. The 
relief contemplated by the claim for permanent total disability compensation cannot be fairly 
determined without the full cooperation of the injured worker. Accordingly, the claim is moot 
and must be dismissed on that basis. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the 'Amended Application for Hearing' filed 
April 25, 2005 be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the scheduling clerk of the Labor Commission be 
directed to cancel any further proceedings scheduled in this case. 
DATED THIS June 16, 2006. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Dale w Sessions 
Administrative Lawr Judge 
0 0 i ua 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Order was mailed by prepaid U.S. 
postage on June 16, 2006, to the persons/parties at the following addresses: 
Kelari Mecham Personal Representative 
Box 803 
Roosevelt UT 84066 
Employers Reinsurance Fund 
160E300S3rdFl 
Salt Lake City UT 84114 
Travelers Insurance Co 
POBox 173762 
Denver CO 80217 
Virginius Dabney Esq 
1060SMainStSte2 
St George UT 84770 
Mark Sumsion Esq 
50 S Main St Ste 700 
P O Box 2465 
Salt Lake City UT 84110 
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Edwin C Barnes Esq 
One Utah Center 13th Fl 
201 S Main St 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
UTAH LABO 
QiSerfc, Acdju i^cation' 
Addendum D 
"Order of Dismissal" dated October 23, 2002 
160 East 300 South, 3d Floor, PO Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
THOMAS KELLAR 
• 
Petitioner, * 
v. * 
* 
SCOTTS ROUSTABOUT SERVICE * 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UT* 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND * 
* 
* 
Case No. 20001132 
Respondents(s) 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
The above captioned matter having been duly considered, and it 
having been determined that: 
The petitioner in this matter has passed away. Under current Utah law 
his claim cannot proceed. However, the Utah appellate courts are re-
viewing this issue. Petitioner has not requested in writing that this 
matter be held in abeyance until we recieve a ruling from the appellate 
courts. 
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good cause for 
dismissing the claim, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the claim of the Petitioner 
be, and the same is hereby, dismissed without prejudice. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Re-
view with the Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. 
The Motion for Review must set forth the specific basis for review 
and must be received by the Commission within 3 0 days from the date 
this decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Re-
sponses to the Motion for Review within 20 days of the date of the 
Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be in-
cluded in the party's Motion for Review or its Response. If none 
of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, 
the review will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
DATED THIS October 23, 2002, 
LABOR 
aron J . EbLe 
Adminis t ra t i s^ Law Judge 
nan/m 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached 
Order of Dismissal was mailed, postage prepaid on-L/ttyMf <R 3 
2002 to the following persons at the following addresses 
WORKERS COMPENSATION 392 EAST 6400 SOUTH P O BOX 57929 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84157-0929 
THOMAS KELLAR PO BOX 32 MYTON 
SALTUT 84052 
EDWIN C BARNES, Atty 201 SOUTH MAIN #1300 SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-2216 
VIRGINIUS DABNEY, Atty 1060 SOUTH MAIN STREET #2 ST GEORGE UT 84770 
BRAD BETEBENNER, Atty 50 S. MAIN STREET 7TH FLOOR 
P.O. BOX 2465 SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110-2465 
DEIDRE MARLOWE, Atty 160 E 300 S 3RD FLOOR PO BOX 146600 SLC UT 84114 
UTAH COMM 
Kathy Houskeeper," 
(801) 530-6344 or 
udication Division 
30-5090 
(\fM\r\r-
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Addendum F 
Order Granting Motion to Cancel Hearing and Compel Petitioner to Cooperate in 
Discovery dated May 21, 2002 
Utah Labor Commission 
Adjudication Division 
Case No. 20001132 
THOMAS KELLAR, 
Petitioner, 
SCOTTS ROUSTABOUT SERVICE 
and EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE 
FUND, 
Respondents. * Judge Sharon J. Eblen 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The petitioner filed an application for hearing seeking the payment of workers' 
compensation benefits on December 1, 2000 seeking an award of permanent total 
disability benefits for accident which occurred on July 25,1975. An Amended Request 
for Answer was mailed to the parties, joining Employers' Reinsurance Fund, on January 
4, 2001. On January 30, 2001, ERF filed a Notice of Appearance naming new counsel 
on the case. On June 25, 2001 , the ERF filed an answer denying liability on the claim. 
On Novemer 28, 2001 this matter was scheduled for hearing in St. George, Utah 
on January 24, 2002. On November 28, 2001, the ERF requested the matter be 
rescheduled due to a calendaring conflict. On December 10, 2001, the petitioner 
objected to rescheduling the hearing. On request of the petitioner and the ALJ the ERF 
examined the schedules of its other potentially available counsel to determine whether 
the matter may be reassigned to counsel available on the hearing date. However, no 
other attorneys were available to take the case as scheduled. Therefore, on december 
17, 2001, this matter was continued due to the calendaring conflict of Ms. Marlowe. 
On January 9, 2002, the petitioner requested that the matter be scheduled for 
hearing to motivate the parties to discuss settlement in a timely manner. Petitioner 
mailed several letters to the ALJ requesting that the ERF waive its defense of no liability 
in the event that the petitioner passes away before the matter is concluded. The ERF 
has apparently refused to do so, which is its right. 
On March 20, 2002, this matter was scheduled for hearing on June 3, 2002. All 
parties are available for a hearing on this date. On or about March 6, 2002, Attorney 
Marlowe sent an email to Attorney Dabney requesting several dates that Mr. Kellar 
would be available for a deposition. Attorney Dabney refused to make his client 
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available for a deposition stating, "Sorry, you should have done that before the last 
hearing." Conditioning Mr. Kellar's appearance at a deposition on the ERF's waiver of 
defenses in the event of Mr. Kellar's death before the matter is finally resolved. On 
April 1, 2002, the petitioner wrote Attorney Betebenner requesting a computer printout 
showing the compensation and medical expenses paid on the claim and threatening a 
Motion to Compel should the requested information not be provided. 
On May 10, 2002 the Adjudication Division recieved a Motion to Compel the 
petitioner to cooperate in the taking of his deposition which was dated May 3, 2002. On 
May 10, 2002, the division received a letter from Attorney Betebenner joining in the 
ERF's motion to compel, indicating that there is important information which needs to 
be obtained from the petitioner about his employment after the accident of July 25, 
1975, his Social Security award and a third party action. As of May 21, 2002, the 
petitioner has not responded to the Motion to Compel. 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
All workers' compensation matters before the Labor Commission are governed 
by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, § 63-46b-1-22, U.C.A. ("UAPA") and the 
Workers' Compensation Act, § 34A-2-101-803, U.C.A. UAPA provides that "the agency 
may, by rule, prescribe means of discovery adequate to permit the parties to obtain all 
relevant information necessary to support their claims or defenses. If the agency does 
not enact rules under this section, the parties may conduct discovery according to the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." 
The Workers1 Compensation Act specifically provides that the commission is not 
bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or 
formal rules of procedure, other than as provided in this section or as adopted by the 
commission pursuant to this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act." § 
34A-2-802, U.C.A. 
The Labor Commission rule regarding discovery provides: 
Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may commence discovery with 
appropriate sets of interrogatories. Such discovery should focus on the 
accident event, witnesses, as well as past and present medical care. The 
defendant shall also be entitled to appropriately signed medical releases 
to allow gathering of pertintent medical records. The defendant may also 
require the applicant to submit to a medical examination by a physician of 
the defendant's choice. Failure of an applicant to comply with such 
requests may result in the dismissal of a claim or delay in scheduling of a 
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hearing. 
R602-2-1.H UAC. 
Section 34A-1-308, Utah Code provides that, "any party may in any investigation 
cause depositions of witnesses residing within or without the state to be taken as in civil 
actions." 
ANALYSIS 
Petitioner filed an application for hearing seeking permanent total disability 
benefits allegedly caused by an accident on July 25,1975 in December 2000. A 
hearing is scheduled on June 3, 2002, however, the petitioner refuses to cooperate in 
making himself available for a deposition prior to the hearing. The petitioner refuses to 
make himself available on the notion that the respondents should have completed 
discovery prior to the hearing scheduled in January 2002. However, it is noted that the 
petitioner requested discovery from respondents on April 1, 2002, well after the January 
2002 canceled hearing date. 
There was no scheduling order entered in this matter limiting discovery to a 
specific time frame. Further, Labor Commission rules do not specify a specific time 
period by which discovery must be completed prior to a hearing. Although it is 
desirable that the parties complete discovery well in advance of the hearing, the 
respondents' request that the petitioner make himself availahle for a deposition in 
March 2002 is not unreasonable. The petitioner has made it clear that he will not make 
himself available for a deposition unless the respondents waive their potential defense 
that the claim dies when the petitioner does. Such a request is unreasonable and there 
is no reasonable justification offered for the petitioner's refusal to cooperate in 
discovery. Due to the petitioner's refusal to cooperate in scheduling a deposition, this 
matter will not be ready for hearing as scheduled on June 3, 2002. Accordingly, the 
hearing will be canceled and not rescheduled until the petitioner cooperates with 
discovery. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the hearing scheduled for June 3, 2002 in 
St. George, Utah is cancelled based upon the petitioner's failure to cooperate with 
discovery. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitioner may have until 5:00 p.m. on 
Friday June 28, 2002 to make himself available for a deposition. If Petitioner fails to 
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provide discovery by the above deadline, respondents may request that >his matter be 
dismissed. 
DATED this 0-[ day of May, 2002. 
THE LABOR COMMIS 
Sharon J. Eblen /) 
Administrative Law Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the21ST day of May, 2002,1 mailed a copy of the attached 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO CANCEL HEARING AND COMPEL PETITIONER 
TO COOPERATE IN DISCOVERY; in the case of Thomas Kellar v. Scotts Roustabout 
Service and/or Employers' Reinsurance FundfCase No. 2001132) postage prepaid to the 
following: 
TRUDY PENDLETON 
1660 W SUNSET BLVD APT Dl 
ST GEORGE UT 84770-6514 
VIRGINIUS DABNEY ESQ 
1060 S MAIN STREET STE 2 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 
BRAD C BETEBENNER ESQ 
PO BOX 2465 
SLCUT 84110-2465 
DEIDRE MARLOWE ESQ 
^OESOOSS^FL 
SLCUT 84114 
KATHY HOUSKEEPER, LEGAIfASSISTANT 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
00113 
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Letter requesting dismissal dated October 11, 2002 
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October 11,2002 
The Honorable Sharon J. Eblen 
Labor Commission of Utah 
Adjudication Division 
P.O.Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
Re: Kellar, Thomas v. Scotts Roustabout Service 
Claim No.: 042CBAXW0159E 
DOI: 7-25-75 
RBMNNo.: 6724-1568 
Dear Judge Eblen: 
On September 27, 2002, Mr. Dabney informed me that Mr. Kellar had unfortunately passed 
away. He indicated at that time, he would be requesting this matter be stayed pending the outcome of a 
current appellate case, which as I understand could purportedly allow Mr. Kellar's estate to pursue the 
benefits accrued through the date of his death. However, I have seen no such request. 
Based on the above, and the present state of the law, which terminates all claims upon the 
injured workers' death, I request the hearing presently scheduled for October 29, 2002 be cancelled and 
this matter be dismissed with prejudice. Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Mark R. Sumsion 
:c: Ms. Deidre Marlowe 
Virginius Dabney 
Barbara McDaniel 
Addendum H 
Letter from Mr. Dabney requesting stay of proceedings 
dated December 10, 2002 
BAKAA.DABNEY A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION FACSIMILE: (435) 652-
SOUTH MAIN PLAZA. SUITE 2 
1060 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
ST. CEORGE, UTAH 84770 
www.dabneylaw 
jaguar@dabnt?yiaw. 
December 10, i002DEf 9, 6 2002 
Hon, Sharon J. Bblen 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Post Office Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-66 L5 
I BY: 
it 
/ " / 
ot 
FAX NO: 801-530-6333 
RE: Applicant: Thomas Kcllar 
Injury Date: 7/25/7S 
Employer: Scott's Roustabout Service 
Carrier: Travelers Ins. Co. and ERF 
Case No.: 2000-1132 
Dear Judge Eblcn: 
Please lind enclosed a copy of Mr. Kellar's Death Certificate showing that he died on 
September 3, 2002 
The Utah Labor Commission has taken the position for over 50 years that industiial claims 
terminate when an injured worker dies. Even though there is no published decision of this State's 
highest Court indicating that, the misconstruction continues. 
My office currently has five death cases, one of which is going to clarity this legal issue. 
The Utah Supreme Court will be deciding the case of Orville E. Smith v. Utah Labor_Commi$gipn 
next year. Oral argument has been set The decision in Smith will likely be dispositive of whether 
Mr. Kellar's family, through liis estate, may pursue his industrial claim. We respectfully request 
that an Order staying proceedings in this case be entered pending a decision in the Sfrtttfrcagg. 
VD:bd 
Enclosure 
cc: Mr. Mark R Sumsion, Mr. Edwin C. Barnes, Thomas Kcllat Estate c/o Ms. Kelan 
Kellar; File 
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